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Joint product dcvclopmcn~ in which suppliers and automakers share
the responsibilityfor component des~ has givenJapaneseauto companies an
importxu competitive advantage in both quality aud new model lead times
[Clark 1989]. In contrq U.S. automakers until recently left little room for
suppliers’ paxtiapation in the design process; vendors typicallymanufactured
components to assembler-provided drawings. Although joint engineering is
usually regarded as distinctively Japanese ~ishigud 1994], Am&an
automotive suppliers often partiapated in component design before 1920.
There were three overlapping stagesin product design in the early &nerican
auto industry.
While pionec&g auto builders like Henry Ford and Alexander Wmton
designed theircars in demiLsuppliers’engineeringcontributionswere crucialin
making a car sufficicndy reliable and cheap to be attractive to consumers.
Vendors like George Hollcy and Cleveland Cap Screw solved critical design
problems in carbureaort and valve productio% enabling their customers,
Henry Ford and Alexander Wmto% to overcome what historianof technology
Thomas Parke Hughes has tcnned “reverse salients” in an advancing
technological front ~ughca, 1983].
After these cngincdng issues had been resoAvd and as consumer
demand for automobiles took of~ over a hundred car makers cntcrcd the
market bemrecn roughiy 1903 and 1918. Neatly all assembled their auto-
mobiles from outsourccd motors, tmnamiasions,and chassis.The presence of
a technically sophisticated supplier base enabled these builders to produce
automobiles without large 6xed capitalinvestment or much tcchnicd cxpcrdse
[Seltzer, 1928, pp. 19-21]. Vendors were therefore rcsponsibk for most of the
engineering that went into aasanblcd cars; components were usuallyoff-the-
shclf parts thatthe assanbkr merely insdlcd.
The third stage of productdcvclopmcnt axangcmcnts began with the
tie to dominance of vcrticdy intcgra~ high-volume pmducas between
1910 and 1920. By 1920, Ford and GM produced threequartaa of the
automobiles sold in the United Statca.From then untilthe rcatmcmdng forced
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by the Japanese cMmgc k ~e 1980s, SUppliCXS’role in product design was
steadilyreduced. SUpphCSSin~easingly produced components on the basis of
customs drawings and s@ficiItions, technical information that could easily
be provided to other suppliers. Increased bamic.rsto enay into automotive
assembly duAng this ptiod were both a cause and an effect of suppliers’
reduced role in product design.These bar&rs were a cause of reduced supplier
involvuncn~ since Ford and GM vertically integrateddesign even more than
producdorL Howcv~ increased barriers to entry into automotie assembly
were in part a resultof the big firms’ strategy.Their vtical integrationmeant
that independent suppliers of key components could no longer reach
minimum efficient scale, meaning that smallautomakersno longer had access
to indcpcndcnt design expertisefor many components &lper, 1990].
Suppliers and Critical Design Ptoblems in the Early Automobile Industq
Despite the kgcnds of lone heroic inventors Mm&g with their fist
automobiles under primitivebackyard conditions, the ilxstautomobile builders
rciicd on an aisting network of supplier firms skilledat producing precision
components for bicycles and caniagcs. EarlybuilderslikeHcruy Ford designed
theirautomobiles thanaclves but contracted out much of their machining and
fabrication- When Ford designed his 6rst car for the market in 1902, he
estimated total development cost at $4,000, enough for “a little money for
parta and helpers.” IXIthe fall of that year, Ford and about tcn employees
worked on the prototype; the only tools in the shop were two lathes, two chill
presses,a millingmachin< a wood planer, a hand saw, a grinding whe~ and a
small forge. AS his biographers Man Ncvins and Frank Hill described the
design process, Ford “had the general idea of a ligh~ simple low-priced
machine and some “noaon as to detaiis.” Ford’s chief designer, C. Harold
WW, made his “general conccpaon spccifi~” turning Ford’s ideas into
working drawings. The other employees built the prototype perhaps offe~
S~StiOUS ss they we= ~- and u 1954, pp. 225-29].
when Ford began production of this car in the winter of 1903, he
conaactcd with the Dodge brothers, owners of “one of the best machine
shops in the Middle WsL” to deliver 650 completed chassis, “ready for
wheels, M bodies, and relatedparts,” for $2S0 each Ford agreed to advance
$15,000 tothe Dodgcsto covcrthe6rst 60chaasis ifthcyuscdthe sumto
invest m machinery and tools spcdblly for his contract Ford paid for the
folbwing forty unitsin cash as comple+ and afterwardpaid the Dodges on a
semi-monthly basis. As Nevins and Hill related, ‘This contra% advantageous
to both aidcai suggests a strong mutual mat between Ford and the Dodge
Brothers, who had been acquainted for years.” Their shop, employing about
ISO~ ‘%s practidy turned ove# to Ford production. While the Dodges
built the chassis, “of course all designs came from Ford and Wfi” ~cvina
and ~ 1~~, pp. 230-32].
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Carburction was a czitical design problem in early gasoline motors.
Fo~ like many other budders, cast about for an effeaive carburetor and -
settledon a mix of units &om mm vendors, Kingston and Scheblcr, in his fust
production run. These cdmretors proved “unaatiaf&tory~’ leaving Ford and
Wfi “stumped.” They called in George Hollcy, an early automobile builder
hims~ who had earned a stxong.reputaaon in carburetor design. As Honey
laterrem “I found Mr. Ford with Mr. C.H. W& sittingin the patternshop
on a bcna and they told me they would like to have me design a carburetor
for theirnew car.” Hollcy’s carburetor, “embodying some pficiples laid down
by Wti and FoW was a success ~evina and m 19S4,pp. 232-33].
Alcxanda WmtoU another pioneering build< had engaged in
production of luxury automobiles since 1900. Wmto% unlikeFo~ startedby
makingmost of the machine in his factocy. A bicycle manufacturersince 1891,
he had acquired both the equipment and expertise to turn out automobiles in
quanaq. Trading on the elegance and distinctivenessof his CSIS,he asserted
that outaourcing detracted from an automobile’s quality. In a 1908 promo-
tional piece, Wmton proclaimed that “every maker ought to be personally
responsible for the cars which leave his factory.” He claimed to ‘how to the
minutest detail” the matezialsand workmanship that went into each car ~k
A@ Em, SepL 1908, p. 9]. The automakerwho assembled cars was only “a
parts manufacture’s sellingagcn~ a mere rniddlz an economic intruder”
~/&Ar&I EnA Dec. 1913, pp. 34].
But Wmton turned to outside vendors when he faced mo critical
design problems. Like Fo~ he had ~uble 6miing an effective carburetor,
calling carburction a “greatbugbear” ~iton Marquc Files, 190~. Initially
Wmton designed his own carburetors, but his 1904 Model K used Hollcy’s
units ~inton Marque Fb, 1906]. Wmton may have switched because Ford
and Olds, two of the largestAmerican builders,had greatsuccesswith Hollq+
design. In 1907 Wmton returnedtemporarilyto an in-house dca@ but by the
end of the decade his cars used a mix of carburetors from samral vendors.!
The b’s engine+ records between 1910 and 1914 also show thatWmton
put pros- components through a batteryof harsh tests in the shop and
on the roa~ teats in which suppliers’ chief engineers of&n pardcipated
-~ Dam and Labomtory Records, Wmton hfarque Fiks].
Earlymanufkutem likeWmton also had trouble manu&uring valves.
Automakersin the &t fkw years of the century had two choices. They could
machine avalvebrnnickel-s~ arcla&cly qenaivegradeofs*
discardingaamuchaakequmem of the blank. This produceda reliablebut
costly vahm Or they could somehow fisten a nickel-steel head to a carbon-
stcel s- @ding a cheapex but leas reliabk valve. As one of Wmton’s
contcmpomciea _ “He screwed (Imada]osq and he sivcted them o% and
he cut them out of S* but they didn’t work” [Crawforc&1955). In 1903,
CharlesThompao~ an engineer at Cleveland Cap Screw, devised a method to
I However,m 1916md 1918Wmtoausedone suppliaof cahmtmq -~
bothof hismoddsp% Ataas&k,Dsccmba 30,1915aadJaauasy3, 1918].
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clccaically weld a ruckcl-steelh-d to a c=bon-ste~ st~ @ding a cheap and
duxablc valve. Wmton gave Cleve~d Cap ScrCWa sole-source contract to &ll
all his valve requirements,but the ~ ~cked enough machinery to meet his
OdCS. Wmton advanced the b $25,000 to buy the equipment te mm out
valves. Two years later he and ~o executives from Wmton Motor Caniagc
secuxeda conaolling interestm the firm; Wmton headed the board of directors
but left day-to-day operaaons m the hands of CharlesThompson (Board of
Directors Minutes, Sept. 21, 1905,TRW Inc. Records]. The stock undoubtedly
made a fine addition to Wnton’s portfolio, but he also gained control of the
- to ensure access to an important source of supply.
Standardized Components and ‘Piratical Skimmers,” 1903-1918
Automobile pioneers like Ford and Wmton retainedresponsibility for
their vehicles’ designs but -cd to outside suppliers for machining and
fabrication and for help in ovucotig technical problems. But the majority
of automobile fi.nm beween roughly 1903 md 1918 assembled theirvelucles
from off-the-shelf components. A typical mid-priced car from this era
contained an outsourccd motor, cmbmctor, transmission brakes, clcctical
syst~ and axles. Winton’s dis-t Of assembled cats had some justice Ford
biographers Ncvins and Hill charged thatmany of those produced before I91O
were a “mass of faults: slack beatings, badly aiigncd bolt holes, loose nuts,
pipes crookedly fitted, and parts poorly machined” ~cvins and w 1954,
p. 323]. Automobile pioneer Bcnjamia Briscoc Iabclcd such assemblers
“manufactwing gamblers,” speculatorswho “had adopted methods that were
described as ‘plunging.’” These “piratical... ‘skimmers’ did not have a worthy
car or any manufacturing ability,” but did succeed at ding a few cars and
much watered stock Briscoe blarncd these producers for bringing upon the
early industry a “great deal of discrcdi~” especdly in the eyes of bankers and
investors ~cl=r, 1928, pp. 32-33].
The Daisy company of Flisx Michig+ a typical assembler horn the
early industry, announced in the summct of 1902 that it was entering the
automobile market Planning “a standard machine in all respects,” Daisy
“resolved not to waste time or money in c.x@mcncd work.. .Whilc the body
design will be somewhat original in many respects, the remainderof thCpSftS
will be secured from makersof standardparts,all of which can be assembled
without delay.” It is unknown whcthcx Daisy completed its announced inirid
pCOdUCdOnrun of 1~ Whkk$ [~dur~, Aug. 28, 190Z p. 21].
Asscmbkts like Daisy who did not want to cspcnd much cngiaecdng
efforr bought major components fxom supplierslike AC LindsayAutomobik
Parts Co. Art kdianapob 5Uppii= Of tMSISllliSSiOSIS, motors, and nmniq
gears, Lindsay took out full-page advcrtiscmcnta in the 1902 and 1903 trade
ptCSS, boldy asking car builders ‘DID IT EVER OCCUR TO YOU thatyOU
can save both time and money by getting our complete running gear?.. .
DONT WASTE YOUR TIME tryingto build gasoline motors, when you cat
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getthan from us for less money than you can make d3Cmyourself.” The b
also offered to equip their running gears with bodies, requixingthe car maker
otdy to label and sell the 5nished vehicle [Motor A,gL Jan. 8, 1903, p. 29 and
Feb. 121903, insideback cover].
Other fkxns repeated Lindsay’s sales pitch. Andrew L.ce Dyke was an
automobile pioneer who built SC Louis’ 6rst car in 1898 and who wrote a
popukr scAcs of repair manualsduring the first KVOdecades of the century.
Foreseeing “that the automobile supply business would become a distinct
branch” of the industry,he threw over car building for partsjobbing in 1899. -
Although “there was at the time but a small demand” for auto parts, he
claimedto be the ‘%rst in America” to dedicate his h solely to supplyingthe
emergingindustry.Dy~ like Lindsay,produced complete runninggears, “and
from the way orders arc being received it is safe to assumethatthere wiil be a
hundred or nvo new automobiles in the countxy that were never inside a
factory other than Dyke’s.” The Neustadt-PerryCo. of SL Louis conducted a
similarbusiness and tgarketed “designs of steam and gasoline caxiages for
which it makes complete sets of parts.. .The company will fbrnish the buyer
withSSSddillg blueprints” [i%fO@~Age, June 26, 190~ p. 12]. A firm wishing
to sell automobiles quickly and easily needed only to purchase chassis from
Iindsay or Dyk or kits from Ncustadt-Pczry. Few builders went to that
cxtrcrn~but the opaon neverthelessexisted
It remained possible for asscrnbly-ordy6rms to enter the automobile
marketuntil the late 1910s. Growing demand for automobiles ensured that a
distinctivelystyled machine built of standard components found customers.
NedJor~ for inatancq relied on sporty styling and eye-catching advaising
to markethis car. One auto histo~ stressedthatJordan bought partaof the
highestqualiyfor his car, but dryly noted that “probably it was the racy wire
whecis” that he “liked best” about his cx “mechanicsnever interestedbim
much” &s, 1985, p. 726]. Jordan’s first modcL built in 1916, used an off-
the-shelfmotor, gurset and cluti carburetor, ignitio% lighting and starting
syst~ and axles.The trade press noted the dif~~ of turningout “a really
distinctiveautomobile from standardized parts.” But the Jordan’s body and
interiorgave the car “a character of its own.. .apparcnt at firstgianccand
rntensi6cdby a close cxamhation” ~.~xtimdik, Jdy 20,1916, pp. 98-9].
A look under the hood reveals just how standardizedthe Jordan was.
l%c motor is a good basis for discussion because it was the most complex
component to design and to buikk an automobile company’s decision to
txnnufacturci~ own motor or to buy from a vendor provides a rough
dicarion of product development cqerdsc and manukuzing skill.Six otha
.buildas used the same mottx as the Jo& Continent4 which produced this
trmtor,sold &c diffacnt engine types - four six-cylindermodt+ and a four-
::i#sxkt plark Of the 177 models offered for sale by 109 Amatcan builders,
~,-tal motors powered 16 models turned out by 12 firms. Six of these
~bkrs used Continentalsexclusively,while the mmainbg six used a motor
‘b a different vendor in each model Only two of its customers produced
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ovcx ten thousand cars in 1916; the top prOd12CCrSin that y= @O~ W~ys-
Ovcrland MamclL ChcvroleG Bui4 Dodge, and Studebaker)alldesigned and
built their own engines. Twen~-four other bna bought carburetors from
Suomb~ Jordan’s vcndoq OUiytwo (Smdebakerand ~cdand) CO~ ded
~ble at s-. But three (Hup~bi4 Pz- ~d Wmton) of the
S= makers WhO ako inatded Bijj elccuical systems were established
builders. Fii, six (Dorris, Locomobile, hlarmo% Pierce-krow, Sttmz,and
Wmton) of the 22 builders who used Bosch @itions also shared the luxury
and #02222a22CCmadcctwith Jordan ~~ ~@~~h, July 20, 1916, pp. 88-91,
Dee 30,1915, pp. 1246-53].
w%acaa these components were off-the-shelf parts,the car’s axleswere
somewhat customized.me T*en-Demit Axle Company, which supplied
Jor@ claimed that its engineers WOrkcd closely with their customers’
-* =P@ d- a v-s d*” T*5 adv~-~=
contim.diy sacs@ its close technical ties to its custo~, one piece told the
prospective automobile owner that “Tiicn axles in yout ~ no matterwhat
its size or pk were selected a22dinstalled only after many conferences
between T-engineers md the@= of he = builder” (TheAn! Em
Feb. 191q. In 1917 the company told autotmd=a that they could not include
Tti&’’m=~to *ha*ph~t~ti ktik-notti~d
o~” T* rei%sed“to deliver motor-car axles except on dciinitc assurance
km the car builder that the car on *e sucet will carryout the promise of the
car on paper.” To assurethatthe flniahedvcbick matched its design drawings,
T- %aiat[q upon knowing” the weight of the car, the size and output
of the enginq the chassis’ weight diatribu~ and “all other details of
conatrucdon which in the slightestdegred’ affected how the axles functioned
as integralpartsof the completed car ~4wAnti Em, Aug. 19171.
Theaeadverkm cm accurately portrayed T-s sales policy.
Eugene W.kwia, thekn’ssaka manager inthiax rccailed that
“OVeIiOada22d~ Oti kd tO bmke22 ti ShaftS and k22U~
customers’ Compiaixlts‘%ere Condnuallycoming in” to early assemblerswho
used un&ized axlea. Such fdurearefkted equally poodyonthcaxlc
manufkmrer and on the auto aaaembleqa strandedmoto2iatdid not know or
carewhether the builder hadinatalled axleaof theproper aizcbwia’s
aperienccs in sellingaxlesto the Auburn company for one of itaearlymodels
codrmedtheae &am.zThe Eckertbrothera, des@eraofthe Aub~claimcd
Zhwiswasvagueaboutthedaaofthis indal~buti tcataidyo ccuredbefcm 1912#
aodprobaMybefors190S.TkAubumcompaoy bqpnprodwioo ofietirstcar, aone-
~ia1903sod foUowdwitbawo-cykkrn 190S.Itdroducdafou2-cyMar
moddm 1910da s&vliorks m 1912[Geocgarm,1969).AT&-Detroit akr&mmt
iu&19101istal alld2shdscustmax Aubumiaoormai&)rK&makiagiKudkdychat
Tiisu#iad axkafbr thcfouf@indcr AuburnrnaOdUCaithatyCar~h AShUIS&”
Dsc 29, 1910, p. 114].Tccbnkaidetailsof Amcrkao cars for 1916 and 1918 show&
Aubummadeitsovoades kirsfous+hdcs andsia+odermodda~~:
Da 30,1915, pp.124M7; aadJsri.3,1918, pp.60-61].
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thatit would weigh about 2$00 Pounda ~d thq qucstcd lhken to provide
* to match. Levis doukd this @w the -, like the “majotity of
b*at&e~Mo~am@kofti&=’s*t Itawhccibasc
led Lewis to a back-of-the-envelope ca-tc of 4,000 pounds, but he “coukl
notgctthan togivcme themctw+tofthc car.’’ InordatOg* ptOOfOf0f
the actualwcighd’ of the biahcd caq he bet the brothas 100 Havana C@S
each thatit would+ 4,600 pounds. Not um~ to show up his customer,
he hoped that this 6gurc was “suffkicndy high so that I would be sure to
Iose.” ~e completed car weighed 4,4oo pounds, and Lewis came daagcrously
close to winning “the bet I did not want towin” &ewis, 1947, pp. 196-9~.
A surveyof Tii-Deuoit’s customer base b 1910 and 1916 supports
Lewis’svicw thatthe 6xmcouldill afford toauatthc =ginAng skillof many
of itscustomers. In 1910,35 auto buildersused T* axles;all of than wac
citha small-volume producers or makers of high-end luxuq cats ~&
AxwTobi&,Dec. 29, 1910, p. 114]. Timkcn rained only nine of these accoums
by 1916. Of the remainda, two firma were making their own axles, three
switched vendors, and 21 exited the industry. In 1916, a total of SCVCtl~
5rms used Tbxdccn axles; eleven of these also outsourccd their motors,
possiblyindicatingthatthey assembled theirticlca and possessed only slight
manukuring ab@y. The remaking six auto companies, who did design and
make their own motors, were hxury builders (C- Do* Lo-
Pcezlcas,Prernia, and Wmton) ~h -4@wwtik, D= 30, 1915, pp. 1246-53].
l%cac companies touted theirtechnicalexpadse sad qualityof construction as
* POkt% ati~ as Wmton’s +- mod indicatecLthey worked
do+ with vendors’ engineers before _ to inataliOUtSOunxdparts.
l%cac builderswould have insistedon close tcchnid contact during a model’s
d=@ ~ =fi- -=ing Data and Laboratory Records, Wmton
;MatqucFiles].s
-. TiS divcxse customer base helps cxpiain why it remaiucd an
‘~t suppiia. None of the 35 automobile pmducexa that used
‘iii-Detroit axles in 1910 were high-voiumc pfod~, T- also
,Supplicdabout 30 suck manukurers asweila sarail-arandhcavy
squipmcsxmakers. Its fortunes were therefore not tied to the fitu of one or
‘two auromakaa. Tinkcn also produced tapered rokr beadnga in its Can-
,O&,pbL_d*~m~&qp-d*~_,
:+-_~~m*.WT*hb_aC=tiH=
.asaumdcustomer ia T*-Detroit ~ and the axle plant enjoyed a
:_~==of_.F-,k** and b=iugawerc
;- =q==ts - SW lab-, q=lial steel alloys,
..
~ Tbc cotry of Dac 11, 1913, m Wmtoo’scn@oc&g mcosdbookcoamirisa
~ of Varioustsdmidckxmmnu“ “ Ofa-riilxtroi tktaxkaod Sadof
‘ksdss@i. Tbc Wmtooaxkumssppamdy amcruse4but thiacmsy-dnt
.~Wmtoo coodk@, howewrbrk9y, takiagaak prodwtioo~otba
-tidcmgoing datkbipwith hti-ofw~d -
@asssth).
.
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accumulated expertise, and a great deal of dedicated equipment.These reqtie-
ments placed their manufacwc out of reach of CRarlyall automakers.Even
Ford bought his Model T axles from the Dodge Brothers before they be~
automobile production themsekes in 1914 [SIO~ 1941, pp. 70-71]. General
Motors satisfied its own * and bearing requircmcrm only after buying out
Weston-Mott Axle Company and Hyatt Roller BearingCompany in 1916.
The histocies of those two companies had much different outcomes
than Timken’s. Both wesron-Mott and Hyatt had sold zxlcs and bearings to
the auto industry since about the turnof the century and had worked together
almost as closciy as the ~0 TAcn plants.As Alfred Sloq then presidentof
Hya% reminisced decades later, Hyatt was Weston-Mott’s major bearings
suppk, the NO companies “were interdependentto an cxtraora de~ec”
[Slo% 1941, p. 48]. In 1905, Sloan learned thatWeston-Mott was planning to
move from its Uti% New York factory to a new plant in Fl@ Michigan.
W-C. Durant and J. Dallas DorL who had just recentlyrefinanced Buick
offered the axle company a fice factory near the Buick plant Weston-Mort
offered a $500,000 stock issue to hance the mov% with Durant and Don
paying in cash for a W of the stock [Sloan, 1941, pp. 43-48].
As SIoarI related, wcston-Mott’s move introduced nvo clcmenrs of
uncertainty into Hyatt’s business plans. Hc feared that Weston-Mott’s other
customers “who were rivals of Buick” would be “disturbed” that their axle
supplier “was moving hundreds of miles to put up a fkctory next door” to
Buick. If they aansfcrrcd their business elsewhere,Hyatt stood to lose a great
deal of sales volume. “SupposeV Sloan also worne~ “this move became a
merger?” ~loa 1941, p. 45].
The Decline of Supplier Participation in Product Development 1910-1920
Sloan called Weston-Mods rclocaaon “a tzivialinadent of itself,” but
believed that it was “the hst step in the integraaon of the automobile industzy.
Thexca&L bit by bz we were to see a constant evolution bringing”
automakers and suppliers “into a closer corporate relationship” ~loan, 1941,
p. 44], cuiminadng with GMs acquisition of both Weston-Mott and Hyatt
(along with severalother major partsproducers) in 1916.Verticalintegrationin
the auto industrybemmen 1910 and 1920 proceeded in two directions.As large
makcm like Ford and GM gained a dominant share of the markcq they
designed and produced mote of theirpartsrequircmmrsin theirown factories.
They also gtadualiyinternalizedthe design of those components thatthey con-
tinued to purchase from vendors. By the end of the deca~ the cnginkg
capabilitiesof the auto supply industrywere visiblyweakened.
The experknces of Louis P- the inventor of the dctnountable
~ illustratedhow the market powet of the * integratedmanufacturers
eroded incentives for suppliers to innovate In 1913 Pcdman filed suit against
the Wrsdard Welding Company, a Cievcland 6nn thathad been inbging
Pcrhnan’s 1906 patent. In early 1916, he hally secured an injj The
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K& pres$ fore$aw “S@X.IS consequaices” for “my car conc~” be~use
over 700,000 cars slated for production that y- used demoutmblc rims, and
Standard Wekhng supplied “a large p=cenwge” of theM [T~ ~~nO&~,
March 9, 1916, p. 470]. A wed ht=, how~~, *C -de press insisted that
aum~ were not “sebusly concerned” about the injunction. h anonY-
mous Deuoit produca thought that “the suitwill have no direct bearin# on
his ~, he “would simply tnake” Stxxiard welding pay PerImanroyalties,an
additionalcost that Standard%vould have to absorb.” In any caa~ he added,
other rim designs “could be resorted to” if Paiman and %uxiard Welding
were unable to come to terms (TbcAxtimobik,March 16, 1916,p. 51S].4
kother inadcnt shows in greater detail how large auto companies
forced suppliers to sham proprietary designs with competitors. l%e Steel
Products Company of ClcvelanA forerunna of today’s TRW, owned a clusta
of pattms giving it a virtual monopoly on the rnanufkture of electrically.
welded automobile components, especiallyvalves, which accounted for about
50 percent of the company’s sales in 1916. These patents ensured that nearly
allvalves in cars other than Fords (which used a different valve design) were
purchased horn Steel Products. As the firm’s president Charies Thompson
recoun~ “~he entire valve business enjoyed by the Steel Products
Company” in 1916 was “attributable to the ownership of patents and patent
tights,and to that alone.” In a statementto the Bureau of Internal%vcnuc,
the company estimated that its patent rights covering the rnanufactxrc of
electricallywelded automobile parts accounted for A but a minor percentage
of its $6 million in sales between 1911 and 1916 ~ax Return Depositions,
n.d.]. But good relationswith customers were also importanqThompson knew
all too well that supplierswho too saongly asserted their patent rights risked
losingmajor accounts.
In 1914 a competitor of Steel Products, the Schweppe and Wdt
Company of Detro~ obtained a patent on the manufkturc of drag links, an
chemically welded component used in the steaing mechanism This
“absolutelystandard” patentwas so basic to the design of the stdng system
that “Gcnerai Motora spent a fortune trying to avoid” it pax Renam Notes,
n.d]. Even so, TRW president Fredaick ~WfOld recded thatSchweppe and
Wdt “had no alternativebut to grant some licensesunder its process.” We+
by 1916, “it had become almost standard practice among the automobile
companies to insistthata supplier of automobile parts make availableto than
addidonal sources of supply” in order to avoid “a complete tie-up of the
automobile companies’ prorktk. “ Because of its monopoiy on drag links,
*dmtfdkm” great disrepute with purchasing~~” and ita
titi*iSmmm*k*momdmoms~h@
1917, %hwcppe and Wilt gave in and licensed Steel Products and anotha
t W* a fewmonthsPerlmmRimCorpo40a joinedWeston-MotLHp~ Deko,
Nev~Jacksoa-Church-Wikox,and Rauy Ekctric aswixdly ownedpam
subsidi&sof GeneralMotors.
48/ DAVID HOCHFELDER & SUSANHELPER
company to make drag links under its paccn~ but it fixed their prices and
production volumes ~ax ReturnDepositions, n.d.].
In 1919 the automakersdiscovered that Schweppe and Wdt had only
“oumardly met” their “objections,” and they bitterly protested the firm’s
price-fixing. Instead of providing more liberal licensing arrangements, the
company countered by trying to reassertits monopoly. It ended its licensing
agreements and scmed noace CO automobile manufacturers that future
purchases of drag links horn other suppks would expose them to legal
actiom BuidG “one of the principalcustomers” of SteelProducts, peremptorily
told the b to resolve the inbgement controvq, oth~ “it would be
compelled to transfu its businesselsewhere” ~ax ReturnNotes, n,d.]. Seeking
to avoid legal cntanglcrnentsand the loss of an impomnt customer, Steel
Products ended the iSSUein ApAl 1920 by buying out Schwcppe and Wit “at
an exorbimnt price solely in order to acquirethatcompany’s drag linkpatents.”
Because Schwcppc and Wdt had &d to maintaina monopoly, Steel Products
“titited illwill” slong with the drag linkpatents“to such a degree thatitwas
confronted with a real problem among its customers” ff’ax Rem
Depositions, n.d].
Conclusion
This paper has looked at a variety of amngmmnts for product dcs~”
in the 6rst Rventy years of the Arncxican auto industry. Each of these
arrangements is very different from the one commonly obsemed in the United
States in the t980s, in which many vendors without engineering capabdity
scrambled to win short-t- non-cxciusive contracts to produce customc.r-
designed components ~clpa, 199Q Hciper, 1991]. Although little studied in
the pasq the organization of product design is intimatelytied up with the
overall evoludon of the Amerkan auto industry.
The innovations of earlysupplierswere instrumentalin creatinga viable
product Historians of the automobile have long pointed out that machinists
like the Dodge Brothers and Lcland & Faulconer provided the requisite
manufacturing expertk and fdidea to transfotm the designs of pioneers
Ford and Olda into tihed cars ~=s and Hall,1954, pP. 222-33]. But the
engineering talent of men like George Hollcy and Charles Thompson of
Clevehd Cap screw proved qdy important in settling the basic fomnof the
intemabmbustion automobik Holiey%carburetor is an exellent example of
%Iack-box” design ~UjimOm, 1995], in which su@iers designed pm within
broad conatrairs=specifkd by customers.
Between about 1903 and 1918, the major tcch&al futures of the
automobile remained unchanged In this period over a hundred &nss entered
the automobile markeL and nearly all took only minor roles in the designaof
~ of course,iqortant innovationsd ore suchas Kctseri@s iavcnti Of8
reliabledcctricSartcrm 1911portt&1966,pp.89-90].
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their cars. A ~ network of vendors - sellings=d~ off-tllc-shelf ~gines,
transmissions,ignition md lightingsystems,and the like- made it possible for
aSSCmtdefSwith fide k.UOwk!& of aUtOmO~e design to bring their cars to
market Ned Jo* for ~p~ was a n@=papCr rcportcs and advmising
managerbefore he startedhis automobile company. And Eugene Lewis, sales
manager for Tiien-Detroit Axle Company, headed off a major reliability
headache for Auburn by convincing that car’s designers to install properly
sizedaxles.
A good example of standardization is the Con6ncnti motor, an
apparently identical component uacd by a number of auto-. Seen from
today’s pas- it is rcndahle that an automaker would * a supplier
to determine thedeaign ofsucha kcycomponcntas thecngine, which isa
major sellingpoint for the finalconsumer and whose chatactecisdcs detcnnine
so much of the rest of the car’s design. The Tiicn axle also represents a role
reversal from today’s pracdcc the supplier took the lead in wiling the auto-
makerhow to design the car in orda to makebest use of the supplier’spart
The third pcAod in our typology is marked by the consolidation of
marketshare in the hands of giants like Ford and General Motors between
1910 and 1920, and the subsequent exit of smda fizrnain the following
decade Scale economics dcsivcd from specialized tooling drasticallylowered
unit costs for high-volume producers and kha strengthened their leading
positions. Firmawith the capitalto do so bought out key vendors to establish
~tcr control OVCfp- quality,and dclivay of importmt p~.c
But the shift of product design functions &om suppliers to auto
COmpZlliCJWas all iMpOrULltpm Of this p=es$ SS_ This Shift had tWO
main consequences. Cuatomcca who designed their own parts wkrc able to
Iowertheirp rocurcmcnt COStS;they eady and fiequendy switched vendors On
thebasis of pzic~ merely by providing theirdrawiogs and spcdcations to the
lowestbidders. Smallerauto companies found it incmash@y difbk to locate
supplierswho were abIe to design important components like motors and
aanamisaiona.nose 6mla that had prm&maly relied on the en@eez@
apcrtiaeoftheit vendorasoon exitcdthemarkst
A comparison of this evolution with the Japanese case yieIda some
=Pf=% con~” J- a~ hcganinthe 1930sbyimporting
rnamypartsand makiag othaa in-house because of a lack of suitablesuppliers.
Gradually, however, the automakem encouraged suppliers to develop design
capabilitiesof their owq and vendors incmais@y shoulderedmapomibilityfor
* a~c AccOrdbg to Fujitnom, automakrxspartly boztowed
dsis’%iack-box’’ ayatanfiom theaircmft industry, andpardydevdopdit
~~ as a mauls of Toytxa’s ex@encc with Nippdenm, its
iAmtasesuppliaof&cuicai~ which Toyota was forced toapin offin
1949 &jimoto, 199q.
~Illddirioq somtmanu6ctumrndK d-price cangemayksvedamsthemseh in
~moviag”upsnaiw intotitehlausymadKt -makiclg Vehidts thasdieytbsm+es
unKdtodtivq mthatimucanthatwouldappeal tocoMumas pavi& 1981q.
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Thus, the CVOIUUOnof product design responsibility in the United
States was the opposite of the course ticn in Japan. This evolution also
included a stagc, - unknown in Japm, in which vendors developed and
sold thcixown standardizedparts.This difference can be partlyaccounted for
by difkenccs in indudal history. In the United Sates, manufacturing was
already well-developed when the auto industry began. Turn-of-the-century
carrhgc and bicycle krts, and their suppliers,possessed much of the skilland
equipment necessary for early automobile production Auto assemblers were
able to draw upoh vendors’ cxpcsience in order to avoid the expense, technical
cxpcrds~ and managerialskillrequired for vertical intcgraaon [Seltzer, 1928],
Japan industrializedlaterand Japanese automakershad no carriageor bicycle
industryfcom which to draw engineeringknowledge and manufactwing skill.
Howewr, the divergent trends in the amount of supplier participation
in product development arc the opposite of what a technological deremtinist
would predict - the United States,the nation that initiallyhad a supplierbase
with atcnaive engineering expertise, ended up with a parts indusrry that
P-~ li~ in comPonen: des~. A k~ f== in =P*g ~
dtvcrpce u the rapidconccmrauon of marketsharein the hands of vtically
integratedautomakerslike Ford and General Motors. This concentration gave
high-volume producers both the incentive and the capabilityto avoid sharing
bargai@ power with suppliers, even at the cost of quality problems and
increasednew-model lead times @clpcr and Levine, 1992].
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